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The oil and gas industry in Louisiana, as elsewhere, is suffering
from a significant downturn in activity. The active rig count on
October 18, 1982, was 279, compared to 476 one year earlier. This slack-
ening of drilling activity is a reflection of the current surplus of both
oil and natural gas on domestic and world markets. Consequently, the
price of a barrel of crude oil has declined to about $34 and uncon-
trolled natural gas has decreased from highs of $9.50 or $10 per
MMBTU to about $3.30 per MMBTU, not much more than the con-
trolled price for section 102 gas (under the Natural Gas Policy Act.)
Be that as it may, the cases recently reported are the offspring of
a more furious past. A law suit takes years to move from the events
that gave rise to it through discovery, trial, appeal, and finally to
reported decision. Thus the number of court decisions in the past year
reflects a degree of activity no longer extant in the industry.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 1981 the Louisiana Legislature amended the Mineral Code2 in
one significant aspect. Articles 206 and 207 provided a procedure for
a lessor or landowner to demand a recordable release of an expired
lease or other mineral right, with damages and attorney's fees the
consequence for failure to provide the release.' These articles were
amended to provide as follows:
S 206. Obligation of owner of expired mineral right to furnish
recordable act evidencing extinction or expiration of right; mineral
lease.
A. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Article, when
a mineral right is extinguished by the accrual of liberative
prescription, expiration of its term, or otherwise, the former owner
shall, within thirty days after written demand by the person in
whose favor the right has been extinguished or terminated, fur-
nish him with a recordable act evidencing the extinction or expira-
tion of the right.
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 15 U.S.C. SS 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
2. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:1-215 (1974).
3. LA. R.S. 31:206, 207 (1974).
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B. When a mineral lease is extinguished prior to the expiration
of its primary term, the former lessee shall, within thirty days
after the extinguishment, record an act evidencing the extinction
or expiration of the lease in the official records of all parishes
wherein the lease is recorded.
§ 207. Effect of failure to furnish act evidencing extinction or
expiration of right; mineral lease.
If the former owner of the extinguished or expired mineral right
fails to furnish the required act within thirty days of receipt of
the demand or if the former lessee of a mineral lease fails to record
the required act within thirty days of its extinguishment prior
to the expiration of its primary term, he is liable to the person
in whose favor the right or the lease has been extinguished or
expired for all damages resulting therefrom and for a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred in bringing suit.4
In 1982 the legislature, upon recommendation of the Louisiana Law
Institute, enacted a series of seven amendments to the Mineral Code
to clarify application of the principles of the Mineral Code to lignite
developments.' Article 11 of the Mineral Code was modified to in-
dicate more clearly that owners of separate mineral rights in the same
tract of land owe duties to one another in exercising their respective
rights.' Article 61 was amended so that the inclusion of the rights
to a tract of land in a mining plan will serve as an obstacle to exer-
cise of the rights if all requirements of the provision are met.' Several
words were deleted from article 115 to avoid redundancy in the newly
adopted definition of a "mining plan."' A clause was added to article
178, regarding partition of land burdened by mineral rights, to make
it clear that partition by licitation will not be precluded simply because
the mineral values of tracts containing lignite might be ascertainable.'
A provision was added to article 191 to specify that under the "open
mine doctrine," the usufructuary of land may enjoy the benefits of
mining operations which are taking place when the usufruct is
created."° Article 195 was amended to give, in effect, a usufructuary
veto power over lignite developments on land burdened by his
4. 1981 La. Acts, No. 612, S 1.
5. 1982 La. Acts, No. 780, S 1, amending LA. R.S. 31:11, 61, 115(c), 178, 191(B),
195, 213(c). The author of this article was the reporter for the Louisiana Law Institute
committee which was responsible for the amendments.
6. LA. R.S. 31:11 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
7. LA. R.S. 31:61 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
8. LA. R.S. 31:115(C) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
9. LA. R.S. 31:178 (1974 & Supp. 1982). This is consistent with article 1339 of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
10. LA. R.S. 31:191(B) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
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usufruct." This was done on the premise that lignite development,
unlike oil and gas development, would effectively destroy the value
of the usufruct since substantial or total disruption of the surface is
involved. Finally, a definition of "mining plan" was adopted.' 2 This
was necessitated by the fact that several Mineral Code articles incor-
porate reference to a "mining plan" and no definition has existed since
the 1976 Surface Mining and Reclamation Act for Louisiana was exten-
sively amended and reenacted in 1978.13
Lessors of mineral rights have had a procedure providing relief
for nonpayment of royalty since the Mineral Code's passage in 1974.2
A similar procedure has now been provided by the legislature for other
royalty owners and owners of production payments."5 Such owners
must give notice of nonpayment by demand letter; the lessee or other
party owing payment has thirty days in which to pay or respond in
writing with a reasonable cause for nonpayment. Failure to pay or
state a reasonable basis for nonpayment may lead to a penalty of dou-
ble the amount owed, together with interest and attorney's fees. Lease
cancellation is not available since the person claiming payment is not
the lessor.
Also enacted in 1982 by the Louisiana Legislature was a provi-
sion for the filing of a plat and for hearings for permits to drill wells
within five hundred feet of a residential or commercial structure.'
6
This provision applies only to wells to be drilled to a depth greater
than 15,000 feet.
LEASE RIGHTS AND MAINTENANCE
Lease maintenance and force majeure were at issue in Woods v.
Ratliff." A high speed gear had broken in the pumping unit of the
lease well, and the lessee stopped all operations after ordering a
replacement. More than the ninety-day "cessation of operations" period
of the lease (for lease continuance without operations or production
when beyond the primary term) passed before the replacement part
arrived. The lessors sought lease cancellation, and the lessees defended
on the basis of force majeure since it was not their fault that delivery
11. LA. R.S. 31:195 (1974 & Supp. 1982). This is consistent with the original inten-
tions of the drafters of the Mineral Code. See LA. R.S. 31:196 (1974), comment.
12. LA. R.S. 31:213(6) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
13. 1978 La. Acts, No. 406, amending LA. R.S. 30:902,904-914, and adding LA. R.S.
30:915-932.
14. LA. R.S. 31:135-141.
15. 1982 La. Acts, No. 249, adding LA. R.S. 31:212.21-212.23.
16. 1982 La. Acts, No. 483, S 1.
17. 407 So. 2d 1375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
of the part was delayed. Both the trial court and the third circuit
held that the lessees could have restored production by temporary
measures. The force majeure clause does not apply when the situa-
tion is not truly beyond the control of the lessee, and here a tem-
porary replacement could have been obtained within ninety days. The
third circuit held that the lessors did not have to put the lessees in
default because the lease terminated by its own terms. However, a
timely demand must be made in order to give rise to an award of
attorney's fees under articles 206, 207, and 20918 of the Mineral Code,
and such demand was not made at the proper time here. Hence, there
could be no award of attorney's fees.
A case decided by the first circuit, Rebstock v. Birthright Oil &
Gas Co., 9 raised an issue of lease maintenance where leased land had
been pooled with other land on which there was a producing well.
The lease contained a clause limiting the lessee's power to pool under
the printed "pooling" clause of the lease. The limiting clause stated:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, any
reference to pooling of the property herein leased shall be [con-
strued] to mean any production below the depth of 10,000 feet.
Specifically, any production above 10,000 feet shall not be pooled
with any other tracts of land."
A unit was formed by the Commissioner of Conservation for a forma-
tion above 10,000 feet which included a portion of the leased tract
and which would not have maintained the lease if the quoted limiting
clause applied. The district court held that the clause restricting pool-
ing to production below 10,000 feet had to be interpreted as applicable
only to voluntary pooling. The first circuit adopted the opinion of the
district court as its own.
The decision in Rebstock is probably correct. The effect of an order
of the Commissioner of Conservation is to treat operations on or pro-
duction from each separate tract in a unit as though the activity were
on each tract in the unit, and the lessee is prohibited from activity
inconsistent with the order. The usual lease form contemplates that
the lease terms are subject to all applicable state laws and regula-
tions. Likewise, lessors generally have been concerned with the good
faith of the lessee in exercising the pooling power under the lease,
not with the regulatory functions of the Commissioner of
Conservation.2 However, a different result may obtain if the lessor
18. LA. R.S. 31:206, 207, 209.
19. 406 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 407 So. 2d 742 (La. 1981).
20. Id. at 640.
21. See Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corp., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16 (1957); Wilcox
v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW S 670.2 (1975).
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and lessee validly agree that the benefits of unit production above
a specific depth would go exclusively to the lessor. Here, it seemed
unlikely that this was the agreement.
The plaintiffs in Rebstock also sought lease cancellation for non-
payment of royalty. Several demand letters had been sent, but they
did not comply with articles 137 and 138 of the Mineral Code.2
Therefore, the court held that demand had not been made properly.23
An oil and gas lessee filed suit in CCH, Inc. v. Heard' to enjoin
his lessor from preventing the lessee's entry onto the leased land to
operate an oil well. The lessor defended on the ground that the lease
had terminated because of the lessee's failure to produce oil or gas
in paying quantities. The third circuit affirmed a decision for the lessor
on that ground. The facts clearly indicated that the well was operated
by the lessee for over a year at a considerable loss, with no prospect
for improvement. The court, applying the standard of article 124 of
the Mineral Code,25 found that the production allocable to the lessee's
interest was not sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent operator
to continue efforts to secure a return on his investment or minimize
his loss. The third circuit faced a similar situation in Kleas v. Mayfield.6
However, the lessee (actually sublessee) argued that the lessors should
have been estopped from asserting lease termination because they
knew or should have known of the lessee's use of the well for gas
storage and they had cashed the lessee's "storage rental" checks. The
court held that estoppel could not apply as the lessors did not know
of the use of the well as a "storage well" (there was no "storage ren-
tal" agreement) and did not know the lessee had reentered the well
in 1974. The lessee was liable for attorney's fees incurred at the trial
level' but not for fees on appeal because the lessor had sought addi-
tional relief on appeal. The original lessee remained liable to the
lessors despite the sublease because the lessors had not relieved the
original lessee expressly in writing. 8 However, the sublessee had con-
tracted to hold the lessee-sublessor harmless; hence it was error for
the trial court to dismiss the sublessor's third-party demand for
indemnification.
In Cain v. GoldKing Properties Co.,' the lessors of land under a
surface lease sought to force the surface lessee, who had drilled a
22. 406 So. 2d at 642.
23. LA. R.S. 31:137-138 (1974).
24. 410 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
25. LA. R.S. 31:124 (1974 & Supp. 1976).
26. 404 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
27. See LA. R.S. 31:206, 207, 209.
28. See LA. R.S. 31:129 (1974).
29. 408 So. 2d 1364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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well directionally from the lessors' land, to vacate the property. The
lessee was producing hydrocarbons from the well on the lessors' prop-
erty, although the well was bottomed on adjacent property. The sur-
face lease was to continue until six months "after Lessee no longer
needs the surface location or the facilities" on the leased property."
The trial court held that this language created a lease in perpetuity
contrary to the Civil Code.31 The first circuit reversed, however,
holding that while the Civil Code prohibits a lease in perpetuity, it
does not require that the lease be for a specific term. Rather, a lease
will be valid if as in Cain, it is stipulated to continue during the ex-
istence of a condition.32
Payment of bonus money for a lease was the subject of several
cases in the past year. In Texas General Petroleum Corp. v. Brown,
3
the plaintiff-mineral lessee sought to recover from the lessors bonus
money allegedly paid in error. The lessee had given the lessors two
bank drafts which were not payable for sixty days, apparently hop-
ing to get releases of former oil and gas leases on the property.
However, the defendants' leases expressly excluded warranty and the
plaintiff lessee did not prevent payment of the drafts within the sixty-
day period. Both the trial court and the second circuit accordingly
held that there was no mistake, and defendants were entitled to re-
tain the bonus money.
The ownership of the right to receive bonus and delay rental was
at issue in Andrus v. Kahao.4 The sellers of a tract of land had
retained an undivided one-half interest in the minerals; thereon the
purchasers received the other one-half interest together with the ex-
ecutive rights to all minerals. When the purchasers exercised the
executive rights by leasing the land, they retained all bonuses and
delay rentals. The owners of the nonexecutive one-half interest brought
suit claiming one-half of the bonus and delay rental. Defendants filed
an exception of no cause of action based on the assertion that the
executive right owner has an exclusive right to bonus and delay ren-
tal unless specifically granted or reserved to the nonexecutive owner
in the act of sale. The district court and the court of appeal main-
tained this exception and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. On its first
decision the supreme court reversed, stating that while the holdings
below were in accordance with the Mineral Code,35 the rights in ques-
tion arose before the Mineral Code became effective and it thus did
30. 408 So. 2d at 1365 (quoting the lease).
31. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2674.
32. See Poole v. Winwell, Inc., 381 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
33. 408 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
34. 414 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1982).
35. LA. R.S. 31:105 (1974).
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not apply. The supreme court also held that to the extent that the
decisions below were in accordance with the jurisprudence prior to
the Mineral Code'3 those cases were overruled so that the case could
be heard on its merits as to the intent of the parties. On rehearing,
however, the court decided that the earlier decisions had created rules
of property which had been relied upon for many years by those deal-
ing with mineral rights in Louisiana. They should not be overruled,
concluded the court, particularly since the legislature had codified them
by their passage of article 105 of the Mineral Code. Hence, the court
reversed its initial decision and affirmed the courts below.
The Andrus decision and another recent decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, Continental Group v. Allison, 7 demonstrate a
refreshing willingness of the court to explore on rehearing problems
with its initial decisions in significant mineral rights cases. In so doing,
the court has minimized or removed some practical difficulties that
were overlooked or insufficiently appraised in the court's first con-
sideration of the issues.
In Veazey v. W. T. Burton Industries, Inc.,.8 the plaintiffs brought
a claim for "negligent breach of contract" against their mineral lessee.
Their claim arose from a lease executed in 1964 which was subse-
quently acquired by the defendant. A well was drilled by the defen-
dant in 1965 and then abandoned in a manner which the plaintiffs
alleged was negligent and unlawful under the conservation regulations
of the state causing injury and loss to plaintiffs. More specifically,
a different company, under a 1977 lease from the plaintiffs, drilled
a well and discovered that two gas reservoirs discovered by the defen-
dant in its 1965 drilling had been completely depleted and wasted
as a result of the defendant's failure to plug and isolate them. The
plaintiffs alleged that the value of the gas and condensate that could
have been recovered was not less than $25 million. The trial court
dismissed the suit on the ground that the petition failed to state a
cause of action. The third circuit affirmed, stating that "regardless
of whether plaintiffs [alleged] a breach of a contractual obligation or
of a duty in tort, there [was] no cause of action because the allega-
tions as to damages [were] too speculative."39 In arriving at this con-
clusion, both courts cited several cases involving drainage and the
"rule of capture.""0 The courts apparently mistook the issue of
36. Ledoux v. Voorhies, 222 La. 200, 62 So. 2d 273 (1952); Mount Forest Fur Farm
of Am., Inc. v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1934).
37. 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981); see Martin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-
Mineral Rights, 42 LA. L. REv. 372, 382-83 (1982).
38. 407 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 412 So. 2d 88 (La.
1982) (mem.).
39. Id. at 59.
40. Louisiana Gas Lands v. Burrow, 197 La. 275, 1 So. 2d 518 (1941); McCoy v.
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
negligent conduct of the lessee in the instant case for the issue of
the proof of substantial drainage and profitability of an offset well
in drainage cases. In the "rule of capture" cases, the "speculative"
nature of the loss is due to the nature of the right claimed and not
to the possible proof of the amount of hydrocarbons lost. Further,
the duty owed by unrelated, adjacent owners of mineral rights on
different tracts of land in "rule of capture" cases was mistaken for
the duty owed in the instant case, where the duty arose from the
lease.' Two questions about the Veazey case should demonstrate the
difficulties it poses: (1) How specific would plaintiffs have had to be
in their allegations in order to meet the standard of Veazey? (2) Had
the plaintiffs brought their claims a day or so after the alleged
negligent actions with the same allegations of loss through defendant's
negligence, how could a court possibly have dismissed a claim of the
sort here?
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently overruled the affirmation
of the defendant's exception of no cause of action and remanded the
case for further proceedings, apparently recognizing the problems in-
herent in the approach taken by the court of appeal.
There have been several very important decisions in the past year
on lease royalty clause interpretation. In the typical oil and gas lease,
the royalty clause on natural gas specifies that the royalty will be
based on the "value" of the gas. Cases in numerous producing jurisdic-
tions have arisen over disputes as to the calculation of this value.42
The problem has stemmed from the fact that gas has long been sold
on a long-term contractual basis and the Federal Power Commission
(now Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) has prevented or limited
the operation of "escalator" clauses (allowing price increases) in gas
purchase contracts subject to federal jurisdiction. This has led to the
sale of gas at widely varying prices, even though it is from the same
field and indistinguishable from any other gas. Owners of royalty have
claimed that the "value" of the gas should be calculated at the time
of production in comparison with current sales of other gas, while
lessees have asserted that "value" should be ascertained by reference
Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936); Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co.
v. White Bros., 157 La. 728, 103 So. 23 (1925); Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Co., 163
So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ rerd, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481 (1964).
41. It is submitted that the Mineral Code may have provided a new standard
dictating a different result from that reached in McCoy, 184 La. 191, 165 So. 632. LA.
R.S. 31:10 & comment.
42. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Lightcap v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d
866 (Tex. 1968).
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to their long-term sales contract and the regulated nature of the gas
price.
In Henry v. Ballard & Cordell,43 the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in a four to three decision, affirmed a "market value" decision in favor
of the lessee. The leases in question were executed in 1953, 1960, 1962,
and 1964, and provided for a percentage royalty based on the "market
value sold or used by the lessee" (two of the leases) or on "the amount
realized from such sale" (the other two leases in question). The court
sought to determine the true intent of the parties and under the facts,
found that the parties "intended that royalties based on the 'market
value' of the gas be computed on the basis of the price received for
the gas" under the long-term sales contract." The court specifically
noted, however, that "[h]ad plaintiffs shown that the purpose of the
market value royalty clause was to provide them with protection as
to price, regardless of what disposition [was] made of the gas by lessee
and regardless of what price was received, then it would [have arri-
ved] at a different conclusion." 5
It is possible, then, even after Henry v. Ballard & Cordell, that
the supreme court could affirm or allow to stand the case of Shell
Oil Co. v. Williams." In this case the fourth circuit, before the supreme
court's decision in Henry, held in favor of the lessors on a similar
claim. In Williams, the leases were executed in 1934 and 1952, and
the court could not find any intent of the parties, to look to the pro-
ceeds of a long-term regulated gas sales contract for computation of
the value of the gas. Presumably, the Louisiana Supreme Court could
allow Williams to stand by finding an intent in 'Williams different
from that intent found in Henry.
MINERAL SERVITUDES: PRESCRIPTION
An often litigated area of Louisiana mineral rights is prescription
of mineral servitudes and royalties. Three reported cases have taken
up the issue in the past year.
In Cox v. Sanders,47 the court was presented with the issue of
whether the good faith drilling of and production from two wells under
a lease granted by only one of two co-owners without the consent
of the other co-owner constituted a use of the servitude interrupting
liberative prescription. The second circuit concluded that prescription
was not interrupted. Where co-ownership of a single mineral servitude
43. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
44. Id. at 1340.
.45. Id.
46. 411 So.'2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
47. 409 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 412 So. 2d 1110 (La. 1982).
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is involved, one co-owner cannot conduct operations on any of the lands
subject to the servitude without the consent of the other co-owner.
While it is true that under article 174 of the Mineral Code,48 the use
by one co-owner of the servitude inures to the "benefit" of all co-
owners, here the interruption of prescription would not "benefit" the
nonconsenting co-owner. Further, article 176 of the Mineral Code,49
which allows one co-owner to act to prevent waste or the extinction
of the servitude, was not applicable, said the court, because neither
waste nor extinction was threatened when the acts occurred. Hence,
the Court concluded that the consenting co-owners should not have
been allowed to rely on unauthorized exploration and production which
was contrary to statutory law. Cox turns on the meaning of "benefit"
in article 174 of the Mineral Code. For future cases, a problem may
be created when a co-owner waits to see whether it is or is not to
his benefit to have prescription interrupted before asserting his lack
of consent to operations or production. Likewise, there may be a prob-
lem for the small, fractional interest (e.g., a 1/16th mineral servitude)
co-owner who cannot be found or identified until after operations or
production have occurred and liberative prescription has accrued. Will
a landowner be able to pay the interest owner for his interest and
then declare it is not to his benefit to have prescription interrupted?
The case of Hall v. Dixon' involved the issue of whether the
obstacle created by one co-owner of land suspended liberative prescrip-
tion that would otherwise have accrued in favor of all the other co-
owners of the land. The court found that one co-owner had in fact
created an obstacle that could be removed only by law suit and there
was no requirement in the Mineral Code"1 that the obstacle be created
by all or any of the owners of the land subject to the servitude. Thus
prescription was suspended as to all concerned. In Allied Chemical
Corp. v. Despot,2 the question before the court concerned the effect
of both a voluntary and a compulsory unit on interruption of prescrip-
tion on a tract outside the unit. Both the district court and the sec-
ond circuit concluded that prescription was not interrupted as to the
tract not included in the unit. This is in accordance with article 37
of the Mineral Code,' but the second circuit felt it necessary to ex-
amine the law in existence prior to the Mineral Code since the rights
would have vested prior to its effective date of January 1, 1975. The
48. LA. R.S. 31:174 (1974).
49. LA. R.S. 31:176 (1974).
50. 401 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
51. LA. R.S. 31:59-60 (1974).
52. 414 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
53. LA. R.S. 31:37 (1974).
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One case involving partition should be noted, Roberson v. Hollis.5
Here the plaintiff and the defendants' predecessor agreed to parti-
tion in kind two hundred acres if the plaintiff acquired certain land.
The agreement made no provision respecting mineral rights. The
defendants refused to partition the land in kind because the plaintiff
acquired the land subject to numerous mineral reservations. The plain-
tiff brought suit to be recognized as the owner of a 57.8 acre tract.
The second circuit, in amending a district court decision, ruled that
the defendants were correct in their contention that they were not
required to accept land in partition which was subject to outstanding
mineral rights. Such rights were not excluded from the partition agree-
ment; warranty applies in partition and minerals are included in war-
ranty. Because the parties had stipulated that partition by licitation
was appropriate if partition in kind could not be required, the court
of appeal amended the district court's judgment of partition rather
than reversing it.
54. Elson v. Mathewes, 224 La. 417, 69 So. 2d 734 (1954).
55. 403 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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